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Does gender matter? 
 
As Gayle Newland is convicted of sexual assault1 over her relationship with a 
female friend during which she pretended to be a man called Kye, the issue of 
gender and consent is back in the public eye. There are a lot of sensibilities 
touched upon by a case like Newland, but it is important to consider what this, 
and other similar cases, are about, beyond the lurid headlines. 
 
There have been a few cases where people who were born female have been 
convicted of some form of sexual assault over their sexual conduct with 
females while they have represented themselves to be male. Gemma Barker 
was convicted of sexual assault for “kissing, cuddling and groping” with two 
girls in 2012. Christine Wilson was convicted in Scotland of obtaining sexual 
intimacy by fraud in 2013 for having sexual intercourse with two teenage girls 
using a prosthetic penis. Internationally there have been other cases2, all, so 
far as I am aware, involving defendants born with female genitalia. The case 
most well-known to English lawyers is, however, that of Justine McNally3 
because she appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeal. 
 
There has been criticism of such prosecutions as being unfair on transgender 
defendants.4 The criticism is that such prosecutions are “not to protect sexual 
autonomy against fraudulent solicitation of sex, but rather to protect gender norms 
and compulsory heterosexuality”5. This is an understandable criticism, but not 
necessarily an accurate one, at least when one looks at the English cases. That 
is not say that there are not complexities in dealing with such cases, which I 
will return to when we have considered what the law is currently. 
 
The law 
 
Justine McNally was convicted of sexual assault by oral and digital 
penetration of her female partner’s vagina. The Court of Appeal upheld her 
conviction stating that  
 
“depending on the circumstances, deception as to gender can vitiate consent” 
and “while in a physical sense, the acts of assault by penetration of the vagina 
are the same whether perpetrated by a male or a female, the sexual nature of 
                                                 
1 Probably sexual assault by penetration but news reports differ. The conduct complained of 
appears to have been penetration by a prosthetic penis. 
2 See those considered in Aeyal Gross “Gender Outlaws before the Law: the Courts of the 
Borderland” (2009) 32(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 165. 
3 McNally [2013] 2 Cr App R 28. 
4 Ibid and Alex Sharpe “Criminalising sexual intimacy: Transgender defendants and the legal 
construction of non-consent” [2014] Crim LR 207. Outside of academic journals there has also 
been criticism, for example Jane Fae “Is gender dysphoria simply recognised as fraud in the 
eyes of the law?” Independent online 12 April 2013. 
5 Aeyal Gross “Gender Outlaws before the Law: the Courts of the Borderland” (2009) 32(1) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 165.  
the act is, on any common sense view, different where the complainant is 
deliberately deceived into believing that the latter is a male.” 6  
 
The court’s view was thus not that deception as to gender will vitiate consent, 
but that it can do so. It did do so in McNally because there was deliberate 
deception over a course of years by which the complainant was sufficiently 
persuaded to buy condoms for the forthcoming sexual encounter.  
 
In Newland the central issue was again deception; the defendant knew the 
complainant well and pretended that her alter ego (“Kye Fortune”) was a 
friend of hers, using a Facebook profile in this fake name. The use of the 
internet to deceive the complainant featured in McNally too as the defendant 
was pretending to be a boy called “Scott Hill”7 when she met and 
communicated with the complainant online some years before they finally 
met. In Newland there was a further deception in relation to what the 
complainant was being penetrated with – a prosthetic, strapped on penis 
rather than one which was physically a part of the defendant. This takes 
Newland beyond McNally as the sexual act of being penetrated by an object is 
physically different to being penetrated by a penis. 
 
McNally did not involve the s.76  SOA 2003 conclusive presumption as to the 
absence of consent (deception as to nature or purpose of the sexual act). It 
does not appear that Newland did either, although it is certainly arguable that 
the penetration was of a different nature to that consented to. This is not 
surprising given the judicial view of deception; the approach in Jheeta8, 
followed with approval in B9, is to deal with deception under s.74 – “a person 
consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice” 
– rather than relying on the conclusive presumptions in s.76. Both cases then 
revolve around s.74. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s guidance on s.74 is found in R(F) v DPP10 where Lord 
Judge CJ stated  
 
“What the Assange11 case underlines is that “choice” is crucial to the issue of 
“consent… [T]he evidence relating to “choice” and the “freedom” to make any 
particular choice must be approached in a broad common sense way”. 
 
Judicial reference to “common sense” tends to draw academic apoplexy. 
However, it does not seem to have caused a problem in either McNally or 
Newland where there are clear, deliberate, active, continuing deceptions which 
                                                 
6 McNally [2013] 2 Cr App R 28 at [26] and [27]. 
7 Scott Hill was in fact the name of a boy at the defendant’s school who was unconnected to 
what went on. 
8 [2007] 2 Cr App R 34. 
9 [2013] 2 Cr App R 29. 
10 [2013] 2 Cr App R 21. 
11 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin). 
the complainants believed, and those deceptions were make by biological 
females who were living, at least partly, as females. Section 74 does not, 
unlike s.76, require that any deception be intentional – it is much broader –  
but in these two cases the deliberate nature of the deception is central to the 
removal of the complainant’s freedom to choose.  Practically speaking, it 
seems unlikely that in the absence of deliberate deception, there would be 
prosecution. The Crown Prosecution Service’s legal guidance on transgender 
defendants in sexual cases emphasises the need to “give very careful 
consideration [to] all the surrounding circumstances, including how the suspect 
perceives his/her gender” noting that as part of the public interest limb of the 
Full Code Test, the lawyer should take into account “[w]hether the offending 
occurred as a result of the suspects (sic) uncertainty or ambivalence about his/her 
gender identity”. 
 
Transgender defendants at a disadvantage? 
 
The short answer appears to be, no, at the moment. If A wishes to engage in 
sexual activity with B, the law expects A to allow B enough information about 
A and the encounter to make their own free choice about whether or not to 
consent. Whether that is analysed in terms of B’s sexual agency or autonomy, 
the central importance of B’s freedom to choose is fundamental to the scheme 
of the SOA 2003. The SOA 2003 was drafted to change consent from 
something sought by a stronger male and given by a weaker female into 
something freely given by two persons, whatever their gender: agreement 
between equals. There are problems with the SOA 2003, but this redefinition 
of consent is not one of them. The law, in this respect, is not protecting gender 
norms or making heterosexuality compulsory. The law relating to adults of 
full capacity is not there to tell people when they can and cannot consent, but 
to protect their ability to make the choice themselves whether or not to 
consent. Adults can and do consent to all kinds of couplings with all kinds of 
adults and the criminal law does not get involved, nor should it.  
 
The SOA 2003 and the Gender Recognition Act 2004 both act to protect 
transsexual and transgender persons. Those who have had gender 
reassignment surgery are protected by s.79 SOA 2003 by which a surgically 
constructed vagina or penis is treated as legally the same as a biologically 
created one. Further, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 enables a person who 
has a settled gender identify different to that which s/he was born with due 
to gender dysphoria to have that new gender legally recognised with no need 
for gender reassignment surgery.  
 
It is at this point that the obvious potential tension arises, between the legal 
recognition of a non-birth gender and the criminal law protecting a party’s 
right to choose with whom they engage in sexual activity. What will the 
criminal law say to a complainant who says she was deceived as she believed 
the defendant was male and the defendant has a gender recognition certificate 
stating that he is male? It seems unlikely that the criminal law will say that 
there is no case to answer because of the certificate, but it also seems unlikely 
in such a situation that a failure to disclose gender history will necessarily 
vitiate consent. Instead it is likely to come down to the facts. For instance, if 
during a drunken fumble there is a penis were none was expected (or vice 
versa) then that is just one of the surprises which can happen during a 
drunken fumble. The lack of a lengthy period of deliberation deception makes 
prosecution highly unlikely in that situation. In the Newland situation where a 
prosthetic penis is used during a penetrative sexual act, that is a physically 
different act to penetration by a penis physically a part of the defendant. If a 
defendant has represented that the penis is physiologically a part of them, the 
case is rather clearer that this has been a deliberate and material deception – 
whatever is represented about the defendant’s gender – albeit that it would 
not be advisable to attempt to use the s.76 presumption. At the heart of the 
decided cases is deception. The reported comments of the complainant in 
McNally on discovering the defendant’s true identity sum it up rather well “if 
she had told her from the start she wouldn’t have judged her and things might have 
been different”. 
 
 
 
